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Ill. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
CO\!1ES NOW the Appellant Gary Alexander Hern, by and through his attorney of record. 
CI IARLFS .'Vi. STROSCIIEIN of the Im\ firm of Clark and Feeney. and pursuant to the Court of 
Appeals· Order. dated September 2 L 2015. supplements the Appellant's brief. 
On April 5, 2013, Mr. IIcrn was stopped for DUI. Ilis Administrative License Suspension 
I !earing was held May 9, 2013. Starer. BesmL 155 Idaho 134, 306 P.3cl 219 (Ct. App.2013) was 
issued by the Court of Appeals on June 2L 2013. On July 3, 2014. Judge Stegner issued his ruling 
in State v. Ncwerr, Kootenai County Case No. CR 2013-10176. On August 20, 2015, the Supreme 
Court issued its opinion in State v. Haynes. No. 41924-2014, 2015 WL 4940664 from a February 
23. 2013 DUI stop. On August 24, 2015, the Idaho Supreme Court issued its decision in State v. 
Riendeau. Docket No. 41982-2014. Opinion No. 8 from a \;larch 21. 2013. DUI stop. State v. 
Bescm, State v. Xauert. State v. Haynes, and State v. Riendeau. arc all cases that developed the issue 
of the Standard Operating Procedures (hereinafter referred to as: '·S()Ps") and rule-making after Mr. 
Hern· s J\LS hearing. The Supreme Court ultimately determined that the 2013 SOPs were mid for 
lack of rule-making. 
The District Court in Hern did not hmc the benefit of the Haynes or Riendeau decisions vvith 
regard to its analysis of J.C. §67-5279(3) issues and the use by the ALS hearing officer of the 2013 
SOPs as a basis for license a suspension. 
APPELLA\:T'S Sl.l'PU:v!EYL\L BRIEF 1 
IV. 
ARGUMENT 
THE IDAHO STATE POLICE STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE 
FOR BREATH TESTING IS VOID, THEREFORE MR. HERN'S BREATH 
TEST IS INV ALU) FOR THE PURPOSE OF LICENSE SUSPENSION. 
In Bobeck v. Idaho Transportation Department. Docket No. 42682, 2015 Opinion No. 5, the 
Court of Appeals noted: 
This Court may overturn an agency's decision where its findings, inferences, 
conclusions, or decisions: (a) violate statutory or constitutional provisions; (b) exceed 
the agency's statutory authority: (c) are made upon unlawful procedure; (d) are not 
supported by substantial evidence in the record; or ( e) are arbitrary. capricious. or an 
abuse of discretion. I.C. § 67-5279(3). The party challenging the agency decision 
must demonstrate that the agency erred in a manner specified in I.C. § 67-5279(3) 
and that a substantial right of that party has been prejudiced. (Cites omitted) 
Opinion. pp.3-4 
The Idaho Transportation Department (hereinafter referred to as: 'TrD") violated the 
pn)\isions ofl.C. §67-5279(3) by sustaining Mr. I Iern's license suspension based on the SOPS that 
\\ere in effect at the time of Mr. Hern·s DUI stop in 2013. There v;erc no adequate administrative 
rules regarding breath testing pursuant to l.C. § I 8-8004( 4) and I.C. § 18-8002/\(3) in effect in 2013, 
as a result. ITD's statutory authority to suspend licenses was exceeded. 
The findings, inferences, conclusions and decisions of the Hern hearing officer were made 
upon an unlawful procedure in that ITD used void SOPs as a basis to make the finding that the breath 
test \Vas done pursuant to Idaho Code. 
r\PPELl.A'sT"S S\:PPIJ.\lE0iTAL BRIEF 2 
Finaily. the ALS decision is arbitrary, capricious. and an abuse of discretion because the ALS 
hearing officers were required to use valid rules for breath testing \\hilc ISPFS \Vas required to 
produce valid rules for breath testing. 
The Idaho Supreme Court in Staie v. Riendeau, No. 41982-2014. Opinion No. 81, notes: in 
Stole v. I Jaynes. :-Jo.41924-2014, 2015 WI, 4940664 (Idaho Aug. 20, 2015 ), this Court held that the 
2013 SOPs \Vere void because they were not adopted pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act. 
Opinion, p. 5. 
IIern is not a case in which an expert testified that the breath testing was accurate. The 
hearing officer relied on the SOPs. R. at pp. 21, 29 1• The SOPs were challenged on appeal as a 
basis for supporting the breath test pursuant to I.C. §67-5279(3). Please also note the emails from 
ISPFS. Augmented Record at pp. 264-424. One would have to wonder exactly what expert would 
be called in the State ofidaho to save breath-testing. Is the Court going to rely on Jeremy Johnston 
as an expert considering his statements in the emails? 
The decisions by the Idaho Supreme Court in Riendeau and llaynes follow Mr. Hem's 
argument regarding the SOPs and the lack of rule-making. Mr. Hem's case is a 2013 Administrative 
License Suspension. The Idaho Supreme Court found that the 2013 SOPs are void. 
1 
'·8. Hem's evidentiary test was conducted in accordance with the requirements of LC. § 18-8004, IDAPA 
Rules, and ISP's Standard Operating Procedure.'' R, p. 21 
·• J. Tpr. Schoonmaker followed all procedures and satisfied all requirements pursuant to LC. §§ I 8-
8002A and 18-8004, and the ISP's Standard Operating Procedure was properly adhered to." R, p. 29 
APPEi .LANT"S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF 3 
Under Idaho Law, in order to have the force and effect oflaw, an agency action charac!erized 
as a rule must he promulgated according to statutory directives for rule-making. See I.C. ~67-5231 
( declaring rules invalid unless adopted in substantial compliance with the requirements oflAPA). 
Therefore. in the absence of evidence of substantial compliance with rule-making procedures, this 
Court must decide that the SOPs arc void and thus, do not have the full force and effect oflaw. If 
the SOP for breath-testing docs not have the full force and effect of law it cannot be the basis for 
ITD's action to suspend driving privileges. Any agency actions resting on the 2013 SOP for breath 
alcohol testing must be set aside. 
Please recollect that Mr. Hem has a valuable property right in his driver's license. In Bell 
v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971), the Court stated: 
··Once licenses arc issued, ... their continued possession may become essential in the 
pursuit of a livelihood. Suspension of issued licenses ... involves State actions that 
adjudicates important interest of the licensee. In such cases the licenses are not to be 
taken av,ay without that procedural due process required by the Fourth Amendment." 
At p. 539. 
The Idaho Supreme Court did not have the benefit of the emails that arc part of this record. 
The emails show the frivolous nature of ISPFS's attempt at tlwvarting valid challenges to breath 
testing. Sec SOPs changes from January 7, 2015; January 8, 2015; and February 13, 2015. The 
SOPs have been dumbed-down and continue to be dumbed-down for no scientific purpose. The only 
purpose for the changes to the SOP is to convict people of DUls and have their licenses suspended 
in Administrative License Suspension matters. 
APPEL! A'\'T'S SCPPIE'VIE'\'TAI. BRIEF 4 
ISP Forensic Services and the ITD have been on notice for a number of years that the SOPs 
were suspect but neither State agency took any action to f<)IIO\v rule-making until Judge Stegner 
issued his ground-breaking decision in State v. Nauer!. Kootenai County Case No. CR 2013-10176, 
Supreme Court Docket No. 0042441-2014. Finally. a District Judge said enough was enough. The 
stay of the appeal in Nauer! has been lifted and the briefing schedule has been reset. 
The Idaho Supreme Court made the determination that the SOPs arc void. As a result, Mr. 
Hem's license suspension must be vacated. It is clear the hearing officer issued his decision based 
on the SOPs and not expert testimony. Mr. Hem has met his burden of proof, pursuant to J.C. §67-
5279(3). 
One wonders v.;hy the State doesn't concede the point by simply doing v,;hat the State did in 
Stme ,•. Victor Smith, 127 Idaho 77,813 P.2d 888 (1991). The State, at the time ofS'mith. conceded 
that the fllegal Drug Stamp Tax Act \Vas unconstitutional and informed Counsel of that decision 
prior to oral argument. The State then acknowledge the statute was unconstitutional at the time of 
oral argument. The State in its Supplemental Briefing should concede that Mr. Hem's license 
suspension should be vacated. 
The State in its Supplemental Brief may argue that the hearing officer's decision in 2013 
should not be effected by the decision of the Idaho Supreme Court in 2015. However, this position 
would be contrary to prior holdings of appellate courts. The Court can look at Gay r. County 
Commissicmers o/Bonneville County, l 03 Idaho 626. 651 P.2d 560 (Idaho App. 1982) in which the 
Coun of Appeals discussed the issue of standard ofreview. A copy of the case is attached as Exhibit 
5 
A for the Court's case ofrefrrence. The Court noted that the District Court followed \\hat had been 
a well-established line offdaho decisions but that the \\ell-established line of decisions \\as changed 
during the pend ency of the appeal by the Idaho Supreme in its decision in C ·ooper r. Board of County 
( 'omm 'rs o/Ada ( ·ounty. 10 l Idaho 407. 614 P .2d 94 7 ( 1980). The Court in Gay noted that C 'ooper 
has fundamentally altered our perspective on the proper standard ofjudicial review. The Court then 
analyzed ho\\ this change should be applied to other cases. The Gay Court noted: '·There are no 
constitutional limitations upon a court's choice to give either retroactive or prospective effect to a 
decision altering a prior rule of la\v. Unklelfer v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 85 S.Ct. 1731.14, L.Ed.2d 
601 (]965)'". Gay, 103 Idaho at 630. 651 P.2d 564. The Court went on to note that the '·pipeline 
approach·' was the appropriate approach in applying a new rule on similar cases pending when the 
new rule was announced. 
The Court can look at the language from the Cooper decision: 
.. It is clear there is a pressing need in Idaho for established standards and procedures 
by which particularized land use regulation is to be administered. To allow the 
discretion of local zoning bodies to remain \·irtually unlimited in the determination 
of individual rights is to condone government by men rather than government by 
law:· 
Cooper. 101 Idaho at 411, 614 P.2d at 951 
The above quote is extremely relevant to issue of ISP Forensic Services and the \Vay it has 
handled breath testing for alcohol in the State ofldaho. It has been Jeremy Johnston and his cohorts 
at ISP using .. weasel words" rather than government by law in breath testing. The Court, in this ease, 
has the choice to send a clear message that government by law is important. Since the Hern matter 
APPL! .I;\'.\ r·s Sl.'PPI E\!E'.\T;\L BRIEF 6 
was in the ·'pipeline ... the decisions from the Idaho SuprL"me Court in llaynes and Riendeau, should 
be applied to vacate Mr. I Iern · s license suspension. The 2013 SOPs were void, therefore there \Vere 
no rules for breath-testing. Mr. Hem's 2013 breath test was imalid. 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court must find that the license suspension \Vas improper and enter an order directing 
ITD to n1cate the license suspension for Mr. Hern. 
DATED this~ day of October, 2015. 
CLARK and FEENEY. LLP 
Attorneys for Appellant 
APPi ILA\·rs SU'PU'vJE:-; IA!. BRIEF 7 
] hereby ccrti fy on the 9th 
day of October. 2015. a true copy 
of the foregoing instrument 
\\as: XX ).failed 
Faxed 
Hand delivered to: 
Edv,in L. Littcnckcr 
Special Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
P.O. Box 321 
Lewiston. ID 83501 
CI .ARK and FEENEY. LLP 
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Page 626 
l03 Idaho 626 (Idaho App. 1982) 
651 P.2d 560 
John GAY and Janice Gay, his wife, Plaintiffs and 
Appellants, 
COlJ:\TY CO:\L\IISSIO:\ERS OF BO:\:\E\'ILLE 
COU:'1/TY, aud Simplot Soilbuilders, Inc., Defendants 
and Respondents. 
:"io. 13647. 
Court of Appeals of Idaho. 
September 21, 1982 
Petition for Review Denied Nov. 15. l 982_ 
[651 P.2d 56IJ 
Page 627 
John :VI. Ohman, Cox. Ohman & Wcinpcl, Idaho Falls, for 
plaintiffa and appellants. 
John [)_ Hansen and Michael R. Orme of Hansen. 
Boyle. Beard & :Vlartin. Idaho Falls. fix de fondant and 
respondent, Simplot Soilbuilders, Inc. 
BURNETT. Judge. 
The issue presented is whether procedural due process 
was afforded in proceedings before zoning authorities, on a 
request to change the authorized use of a particular parcel 
of land. Simplot Soilbuilders, Inc., sought and obtained 
from Bonnc\-ille County a variance to construct a fertilizer 
storage and blending facility in an area zoned A-! 
agricultural. The owners of adjoining property, John and 
Janice Gay, brought this action to vacate the variance. Thev 
alleged that numerous procedural errors had infected th~ 
\·ariance granting process, and that certain findings made by 
the zoning authorities were unsupported by a sketchy 
record, The district court upheld the variance and dismissed 
the Gays' complaint. We reverse. 
The threshold question is whether the district court 
applied the comtct standard of judicial re\-iew The district 
court--following what had been a well-established line of 
Idaho decisions--held that all actions of zoning authorities 
\,-ere presumptively 
Page 628 
1651 P.2d 5621 valid. and that the scope ofjudicial r\:\-icw 
limits:d to looking fi_,r capriciousness. arbitrariness or 
discrin1ination. Sec, e.g., DaHson [)1re1prises, Inc. i' Blainr.: 
Countr, 98 Idaho 506. 567 P.2d 1257 (1977): 
Rcadi -lo-Pour, Inc. 1 J!cCov, 95 Idaho 510, 511 P_2d 792 
( 1973 ). However. during the pendency of this appeal. our 
Supreme Court issued its decision in Cooper L Board of 
Countr Comm'rs ofAda Counti, IOI Idaho 407,614 J>.2d 
947 ( l 9?10). Cooper has fundamentally altered our 
perspective on the proper standard of judicial re\iew 
Cooper draws a distinction between determination of 
general zoning policies and the application of such policies 
to specific situations_ The former function is deemed 
legislative. and the latter quasi-judicial_ The Cooper opinion 
treats the restricted standard ofjudicial review. employed 
by the district court and illustrated by Dawson and 
Ready-to-Pour. as a form of judicial deference to legislative 
action. This restrained standard of review is appropriate to 
such legislative determinations as the adoption of 
comprehensive plans or the enactment of general zoning 
ordinances_ In contrast, a decision whether to rezone a 
particular parcel of property is regarded by Cooper as 
quasi-judicial, subject to due process protections_ Sec also, 
e.g., Fasano L Board ofC01111t1 Comm'rs of /Vashingron 
Coun(\'. 264 Or. 574. 507 P.2d 23 (1973). O\em1kd on 
other grounds, Xcuhcrgcr i Ciry of Pordand. 288 Or. 585, 
607 P 2d 722 ( 1980). 
Although the county's action here has been 
characterized as the granting of a !lvariancc, 11 it \\'as in 
reality a change of authorized land use for a particular 
parcel of property. The concept of a variance is narrowly 
treated by LC.~ 67-6516. par1 of the Local Planning Act of 
1975. which had been enacted before Simplot filed its 
application with the county, The statute defines a variance 
as follows: 
a modification of the requirements of the [zoning] 
ordinance as to lot size, lot CO\ erage, width, d-:pth, front 
yard, side yard. rear yard. setbacks, parking space, height of 
buildings. or other ordinance provision affecting the size or 
shape of a structure or the placement of the structure upon 
lots, or the size oflots. 
A variance, as so defined, does not inc Jude a change of 
authorized land use. Rather, it is limited to adjustment of 
certain regulations concerning the physical characteristics 
of the subject property. 
APPENDIX 1 
It is not disputed in this that a fertilizer storage and 
blending facility foll outside the scope of permitted land 
in an A-I agricultural The "rnriancc" procured 
by Simplot made permissible a land use previously not 
authorized by the 7oning ordinance. We cannot ,·kw a 
request for such a '\·ariancc" differently from the request 
for raoning addressed in Cooper. We h,ild that the Cooper 
requirement of procedural due process i, appl1cahk to 
proceeding;,; on a requ(.'.st h) change the land use authori?t.:d 
for a particular parcel of property, regardless of whether the 
subject of such proceedings carric, the labd '\·ariancc" or 
1
'rc7oning." 
The right to procedural due procc,s i, sccur.;d by 
Article L Section 13, of the Idaho Constitution and by the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
That adjoining land owners, who arc "affrctcd persons'' 
under I.C. ( 67-6521, h:ne property interest;; entitled to due 
process protection ha, not been contested in this case. 
!knee, wc presume such interests to exist "and the question 
then is what process is due." /'an Ord.::n i·. State:, 102 Idaho 
663.665,637P.2d 1159, 1161 (!9g!). 
The United States Supreme Court has imparkd an 
elastic quality to the concept of procedural due process, 
'[D]uc process' .. is not a technical conception with a fixed 
content unrelated to time, place and circumstances .. 
[l]dentification of the specific dictaks of due process 
generally rc,1uircs consideration of three distinct factors: 
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official 
action: seccmd, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such 
interest through the procedures used, and the probati\'e 
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural 
safeguards; and finally, 
Page 629 
165! P.2d 563] the Gowmment's interest, including the 
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens 
that the additional or substitute requirements would entail. 
:lfathms \. E!drh(r;e, 424 U.S, 319, 334-35, 96 S.Ct. 
893, 902-03, 47 LEd.2d 18 (1976): accord, Van Orden v. 
State, supra. The full dimensions of procedural due process, 
as contemplated by the Cooper decision, have yet to be 
developed. However, on the facts presented in Cooper, our 
Supreme Court held that a deprivation of due process 
resulted from (a) failure to give notice ofa second meeting 
of zoning authorities (after a public hearing), when a 
rezoning request was considered and staff views were 
expressed: (b) failure to keep a transcribable verbatim 
record of the proceedings before the zoning authorities; and 
(c) failure to make specific written findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, upon which the decision on the 
rezoning request was based. Cooper, IOI Idaho at 411, 614 
P.2d at 95 l. 
In the present case. Bonneville County and Simplot 
hm·c argued thm the failures identified in Cooper merely 
illustrate factors rckrnnt to a due procc,s determination. 
and that none of them represent, a deprivation of due 
process per However, specific findmgs and notice of 
mct:tings--frorn which m: infer the right to a reasonable 
opportunity to present and to rebut cvidcnce--havc been 
recognized as fundamental clements of procedural due 
process in a Yariety of contexts. See, e.g .. Goss i· Lope::. 
419 U.S. 565, 95 SCt. 7'29, 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975): 1/o!jfi. 
:\fcDomdl, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 LEd.2d 935 
( 1974). :Vlorcover, we view a transcribablc record as 
indispensable to rneaningfol judicial reYiew of rezoning 
proceedings wher..: the sufficiency of notice, adequacy of 
opportunity to present or to rebut e\·idencc, or the existence 
of cYidencc supporting the agency's findings may be put at 
issue. [ I J Under Idaho law, rezoning decision might he 
reviewed on any of these points. l.C. §~ 67-652l(d), 
67-521 S(g). 
\\'e belicYe that all the factors mentioned in Cooper, 
together with the opportunity to present and to rebut 
evidence, meet the standards for due process requirements 
under Mathews v. Eldridge, infra. First, each requirement is 
germane to the property interests of parties seeking, or 
alh·crsely affected by, a change of zoning. Secondly, the 
requirements afford minimum safrguards against erroneous 
deprivation of such interests. Finally, none of the 
requirements appears to be unduly burdensome. Even the 
requirement of a tran,cribablc record--which has excited 
some controversy in this appeal--compcls zoning authorities 
to do no more than conduct the public's business "on the 
record," preserve documents receh·ed and produced, and 
operate a tape recorder during hearings or meetings wht:n 
information on a requested 7oning change is received or 
official action is taken. Accordingly, we hold that notice, 
opportunity to present and to rebut evidence, preparation of 
specific findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the 
keeping of a transcribable record comprise a common core 
of procedural due process requirements, constitutionally 
mandated in all cases where zoning authorities are 
requested to change the land use authorized for a particular 
parcel of property. 
I! 
We tum now to the questions of whether, and how. 
these due process requirements should be applied to the 
instant case. As noted previously, Cooper was decided 
while this appeal was pending. Bonneville County and 
Simplot, in a well-crafted brief and argument, urge that 
requirements based on Cooper not be applied 
"retroactively" here, 
There no constiturional limirations upon a court's 
choice to give either or prospcctin: effect to 
decision altering a prior rnlc of law. Unklcttcr 1 Walker. 
381 C.S. 618. 85 S.Ct. 1731. 14 
Page 630 
[651 P.2d 5641 LEd2d 601 (1965): Grc'al \'or/hem 
Railm1y Co. 1·. S1111h11rsl Oil & Refining Co, 287 U.S 358. 
53 SCt. 145. 77 LEJ. 360 ( l 932) The choice is 
discretionary. The range of mailable choices includes 
applying a new rule of law to all cases ("retroacti\ity" ): 
applying the rule only to future cases ("prospcctivity"J: 
applying the rule to future cases and to the case decided (a 
form of"rnodificd prospectivity"); or applying the rule to 
future cases. to the case dccickd. and to similar cases 
pending on appeal when the new rule was announced (a 
broader form of "modified prospectiYity"J See, e.g .. 
7lzompson 1·. !fagan. 96 Idaho I 9, 5:?3 P.2d l 365 ( l 974); 
Dm,son \ Olson, 94 Idaho 636. 496 P.2d 97 ( 1972 ). For 
case ofrcference. we will call the broader form of modified 
prospectivity the "pipe]in,2 approach," because it includes 
similar cases in the appellate system "pipeline" when the 
new rule of law was announced. 
In Cooper our Supreme Coun did not explicitly pass on 
the retroactivity question. However, the court applied its 
holding on procedural due process to the facts of that case. 
Similarly. in Walker-Schmidt Ranch v. Blaine County, 101 
Idaho 420. 614 P.2d 960 ( l 980)--a n:zoning case pending 
when Cooper was decided--the Supreme Court reversed a 
dekrmination by zoning authorities. and remanded the case 
with an instruction to the district court that the zoning 
authorities be directed to comply with Cooper Thus, it 
plainly appears that the Supreme Court has not explicitly 
rejected rctroactivity, and has, at least. adopted the 
"pipeline approach"--applying Cooper to the case decided 
and to similar cases pending when the rule of Cooper was 
announced, as well as to future cases. We need not address 
the possibility of "retroactivity" in this case. The "pipeline 
approach" is sufficieut to determine the impact of Cooper 
upon this appeal. 
Simplot and Bonneville County contend that this case 
1s outside the "pipeline" because it is not a "similar" 
pending case. They point to the fact that Cooper and 
Walker-Schmidt were appeals from judgments upholding 
denials of rezoning requests. ln contrast. this appeal has 
been taken from a judgment upholding the grant of a change 
in authorized land use. The significance of this distinction, 
we are told. is that during the course of this litigation 
Simplot actually constructed the facility for which the 
change in authorized land use had been sought. Simplot 
does not contend that the appeal has been rendered moot. 
However, we are now asked to exempt this case from due 
process scrutiny on the ground that Simplot had a right to 
expect that the decision of the county zoning authorities 
ultimately would be upheld under the pre-Cooper standard 
of judicial re,icw 
Reliance upon an existing rule of law is one of the 
criteria to be considered in choosing among the Yari ous 
rctroacti\·ity and prospccti\·ity alternatives. It must be 
weighed against two other criteria--thc purpose of the new 
rule of law announced. and the effect of retroacti\ity or 
prospecti\ity upon the administration of justice. Sec, e.g .. 
Jones l'. Watson, 9X Idaho 606, 570 P.2d n4 (1977): 
Rogers\. Ycllmr.,·rone Park Co. 97 Idaho 14. 25. 539 P.2d 
566,577 (1974) (on rehearing): Thompson\. Hagan. supra. 
Ordinarily. these criteria arc considered in the ckcision 
announcing a new rule of law. [lowc\·cr. because no such 
analysis has yet been articulated in connection with Cooper. 
and because the instant case is asserted to be dissimilar, ·we 
will analyze the criteria here. 
The reliance claimed by Simplot is not upon the 
pre-Cooper rule itself. but upon an expectation that 
applying the pre-Cooper standard necessarily would ha\·c 
resulted in upholding the county's zoning decision. \\'c need 
not indulge in an "opinion within an opinion." actually 
applying the pre-Cooper standard. It is sufficient to note 
that judicial review in this case was sought to determine 
whether the proper zoning ordinance had been used by the 
county authorities: \\·hether findings of fact, which were 
entered specifically in response to this litigation and which 
consisted partly of a recitation of language from the zoning 
ordinance, were valid: and whether the findings of fact were 
adequately suppot1ed by a record 
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[651 P,2d 5651 which consisted partially of disputed 
recollections by zoning officials of the proceedings before 
them. We cannot say that the final disposition of such 
issues, on appeal. would have been free from doubt under 
the pre-Cooper standard. Moreover. when the district judge 
was informed that Simplot had staned construction while a 
petition for judicial review was pending. he pointedly stated 
on the record, that "you are building at your peril. as it 
were." Simplot's counsel acknowledged that "[t]here are 
certain risks from this point on, [ suppose." The weight that 
might otherwise have been ascribed to the reliance criterion 
is diminished in this case. 
Against this diminished claim of reliance we must 
weigh the effect of the "pipeline approach" upon the 
purpose of the Cooper decision, and upon the 
administration of justice. The following language from the 
Cooper opinion is relc,ant to both of these criteria: 
It is clear that there is a pressing need in Idaho for 
established standards and procedures by which 
APPENDIX 1 
particularized land use regulation to be administered, To 
allow the discretion of local zoning bodies to remain 
\'irrually unlimited in detennination of indr,idual rights 
is to condone grFcrnmerlt by men rather than government 
by law, [IO l Idaho at 4 J l. 614 P 2d at 951,] 
\\' c belie Ye this clear expression of purpose would be 
thwarted if rcfoscd to apply the requirements of 
procedural due process to this It appears that the 
county zoning authorities made no specific findings to 
support their ckcision until faced with a lawsuit testing the 
\alidity of the rkcision, It further appears that the findings 
were ba,ed largely upon one zoning board member's 
familiarity with the property in question, The county kept 
no transcribablc record from which a re\'icwing court could 
determine the extent to which the infomiation known to this 
board member was presented at a public meeting of which 
notice had been gi\'en. or the extent to which the interested 
parties were afforded an opportunity to rebut such c\idcnce 
We also believe that the proper administration of 
justice will best be scr\'cd by applying due process 
requirements here, Due to the lack of an adequate record of 
what had transpired at the county le\'el, the district judge 
was forced to take conflicting evidence, and to make 
findings. on how the zoning proceedings were conducted 
and on what basis the county reached its decision, The court 
then was required to rc\'icw the propriety of the county's 
decision upon a record which the court itself had 
participated in creating. Dc\·cloping the record of 
proceedings before an administrative agency, from 
conflicting evidence. falls outside the purposes for which a 
reviewing court should take e,·idcnce under applicable 
portions of JC, ~ 67-5215. CJ llill 1 Board of'Co1111!1' 
Comm'rs, 101 [daho 850,623 P,2d 462 (1981) (holding trial 
de novo inappropriate upon petition for judicial reYiew of 
denial of a rezoning application), :\fore fundamentally, we 
Yiew this process as a distortion of the judicial review 
fonction, 
Weighing all of the criteria--rc!iance on the prior rule 
of law, the purpose of the new rule, and the effect upon the 
administration of justicc--wc conclude that the "pipeline 
approach" to Cooper is appropriate and that it embraces this 
case, We hold that the procedural due process requirements 
we ha\'c drawn from Cooper govern disposition of this 
appeal, Because no transcribablc record was kept and 
because, without such a record, a reviewing court in this 
case could not determine that the interested parties received 
notice of all meetings at which information concerning rhe 
zoning request was recei\'ed. or that an opportunity to rebut 
such information was afforded, we conclude that the 
county's decision must be set aside. 
The other issues raised by the petition for judicial 
review likely would be mooted, or resolved, if the county 
conducted proceedings in confonniry with requirements 
ha,,c drawn from Cooper Therefore:. the judgment of 
the di:arict court reversed, and the 
direction that the district court require 
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is remanded \Vith 
[651 P.2d 566] Bonnc,i!Ic County to reconsider Sirnplot's 
request in confonnity with this opinion, 
\\ALTERS, C, Land SWANSTRO:\I, J. concur, 
Notes: 
[I] Since the filing of thi, appeal. the Idaho Legislature has 
imposed a statutory requirement of a transcribabk record 
upon all land use proceedings where judicial review is 
arnilablc, See LC ~ 67-6536 (added in 1982), 
